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out proof of special damages. But in order to do this courts have been
forced to classify the wrong as libel instead of slander. Thus, in Soren-
sen v. Wood, et al., 123 Neb. 345, 82 A.L.R. lO98 (932), radio
station KFAB was held liable for defamation delivered orally over the
air without proof of special damages. For a general discussion of the
problem, and criticism of this case see J. E. Royce, "Defamation via
Radio," I Ohio St. L.J. i8o. Miles v. Wasmer, 172 Wash. 466
(1933), another radio case, did not rule as to whether the injury was
libel or slander. But the legislature of Washington in 1935 enacted
that: "Every malicious publication by writing * * * radio broadcast-
ing, or which shall * * * transmit the human voice or reproduce the
same from records or other appliances or means * * * shall be libel."
Wash. Crim. Laws, Ch. 117, sec. 2424. This obviously includes
phonograph and dictaphone records, talking pictures, etc.
There seem to be only three cases involving defamation by motion
pictures. The action was obviously libel in Merle v. Sociological Re-
search Film Corp., 152 N.Y.S. 829 (1915) where a silent film was in
dispute. But talking pictures gave rise to the same action in Brown v.
Paramount Public. Corp., 27o N.Y.S. 544 (I934), which involved an
imputation of immorality in the picture "An American Tragedy." An
English case, Yousoupoff v. M. G. M. Pictures, Ltd., reported in the
N. Y. Times on March 6, 1934; expressly held the action to be libel
instead of slander. A large verdict of £25,000 was awarded in this
case, which arose from certain imputations, made orally, in "Rasputin
and the Empress." LYLE E. TREADWAY
DIVORCE
DOMESTIC RELATIONS- RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREES
OF DIVORCE WHERE DOMICILIARY REQUIREMENT IS SHORT
OR ABSENT
Of all divorce problems, that of the divorce obtained in a sister state
or foreign country is one of the most complex. This fact is due to the
great diversity of "residence" requirements. The following are the
"residence" requriements of the jurisdictions under discussion: Nevada,
six weeks;' Idaho, ninety days; 2 Arkansas, three months;' Florida,
three months; 4 Mexico, no residence whatsoever, and a divorce may be
'Nev. Sess. Laws, 1931, Chap. 97-
Idaho Gen. Code, 31-701, 1932.Ark. Sess. Laws, 1931, Chap. 71.
Laws of Fla., 1935, p. 444-
obtained by an alien simply by employing counsel to obtain the decree; 5
France, no specific length of residence, but both parties must be resi-
dents (residence in France does not mean domicile) although it is pos-
sible to serve notice on the defendant's counsel by special arrangement
by the defendant before leaving France.' The statutes in the above
American jurisdictions use the term "residence" for domicile and the
courts of these jurisdictions say that there must be a domicile by the peti-
tioner before a divorce is valid.
From the short residence requirements of these few jurisdictions it
seems clear that they are not insisting upon the establishment of a bona
fide domicile in any true sense in order to give their courts jurisdiction
for the purpose of granting divorces. When a petitioner goes to one of
these states, he or she has but two thoughts in mind and they are to
obtain a divorce in the shortest possible time, and to avoid the stricter
laws of the home state. Where the decrees have been attacked by courts
of the matrimonial domicile, the petitioner has frequently been found
to have left the state where the divorce has been obtained soon after it
was granted and to have returned to the matrimonial domicile, which
shows that the petitioner went to the other jurisdiction for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce and not to establish a domicile of more or less
permanence.
The state has an interest in marriage as a public institution; and
public policy requires that the marriage be preserved in all cases where
the purpose of marriage is not defeated. The grounds of divorce pro-
vided in the statutes are indicative of the policy which the various states
have had in this matter. The interpretation of these statutes by the
courts, whether liberal or narrow, likewise indicates the local policy.
If the citizens of any state are permitted to go into another state where
the rules of divorce are less stringent to obtain a divorce and then return
to the state of their matrimonial domicile and have this foreign decree
fully recognized, it will tend to break down the policies of the state of
the matrimonial domicile. Therefore, in some cases it is necessary,
because of public policy, to deny recognition of the divorce decrees here
under discussion. But the several states are bound by Art. IV, Sec. i of
the United States Constitution which provides, "Full faith and credit
shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial pro-
ceedings of every other state." One state, however, is not bound by this
section of the constitution to recognize a judicial proceeding in another
state unless that court had jurisdiction of the cause.7
xS Am. Bar Assn.Jr. 709 (1929).
French Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 59; Art. 875, Ibid; Art. 14, Civil Code; Art.
iS, Civil Code.
'Bell v. U.S., 1S1 U.S. 17S, 45 L. Ed. 804 (19ox); Reed v. Reed, 5z Mich. 117,
5o Am. Rep. 247 (1883)5 Field v. Field, zi5 Ill. 496, 74 N.E. 413 (19o).
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In this country, it is established by the great weight of authority that
the jurisdiction of the cause is dependent upon whether the petitioner
has established a bona fide domicile within the state of the forum where
he seeks a divorce. Domicile is that place in which a person has volun-
tarily fixed the habitation of himself and family, not for a mere special
or temporary purpose, but with present intention of making a perma-
nent home until some unexpected event shall occur and induce him to
adopt some other permanent home.8 Normally a wife's domicile is that
of her husband, but she may establish a separate domicile, if she chooses,
whenever she has grounds for divorce or a valid reason for leaving her
husband.' A residence is generally transient in its nature. It becomes a
domicile when it is taken up animo manendi.'°
The majority of the state courts, including, Ohio, require only that
the petitioner be domiciled within the state of the forum, and they permit
the defendant to be served with notice by means of publication." New
York will recognize a foreign decree under the following circumstances:
(I) When the decree was obtained at the last matrimonial domicile;
(2) if the defendant in a divorce proceeding was domiciled in a foreign
state and that state would recognize the decree; or (3) where the peti-
tioner or someone claiming under him attempts to attack the decree."2
In some recent cases the New York court has held that appearance by
the defendant will eliminate any objection to a decree rendered where
only one party is domiciled."
It is desirable to deal with the cases pertaining to divorces obtained
in sister states separately from those obtained in foreign countries. It
has been repeatedly held that a decree rendered where neither party is
domiciled is not entitled to extraterritorial recognition either by "full
faith and credit" or by "comity."' 4 A domicile which is "colorable,"
'Di Brigide v. Di Brigide, x6 N.J. Eq. 7o8, 172 AtI. 505 (1934.)5 Cochras v.
Cochran, 173 Ga. 856, s6z S.E. 99 (1932).
' Burtis v. Burlis, x61 Mass. 508, 37 N. E. 740 (1894).
"°in Matter of Newcomb, 192 N.Y. 238, 84 N.E. 95o (19o8); Cohen v. Daniels,
25 Iowa 88, 13 L.R.A. 786 (z868).
"
1 Spaulding v. Spaulding, ix Ohio App. 143, 30 Ohio C.A. 475 (I919); Daerr v.
Forsythe, 5o Ohio St. 726, 35 N.E. IO5 (1893)5 Crimm v. Crimm, zt Ala. 13, 99 So.
301 (1924); Holdrof v. Holdrof, x9S Iowa iS8, 197 N.W. 91o (x924).
The United States Supreme Court held in Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. x55, z
Sup. Ct. Rep. 544 (1gox), that a decree obtained at the matrimonial domicile where serv-
ice was had by publication on the wife who had moved to New York,*was entitled to "full
faith and credit." The same court also held, in Haddock v. Haddock, zoi U.S. 562, 26
Sup. Ct. Rep. 525 (sgo6), that a divorce obtained by the husband who was domiciled in
Connecticut which was not the matrimonial domicile, and where the wife was domiciled
in New York and was only constructively served, did not come within the "full faith and
credit" clause.
i Corn. L.Q. 141 (1925).
X Rupp v. Rapp, xs6 App. Div. 389, 141 N.Y.S. 484 (1913); Richards v. Richards,
87 Misc. Rep. 134, 149 N.Y.S. io28 (1914).
1" Bell v. U.S., supra, note 7; Reed v. Reed, supra, note 7; Van Fossen v. State, 37
Ohio St. 317, 4x Am. Rep. 507 (s88s); 9 R.C.L. sec. 338.
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that is, for purpose of divorce only, confers no jurisdiction upon the local
court to grant a divorce which will have any extraterritorial validity.15
And if there is no intention of establishing a domicile in the sister state,
a divorce decree of that state is a nullity." Motive may also be im-
portant in determining whether a bona fide domicile has been estab-
lished. 7 The motive is to be considered in deciding whether the intent
to establish a bona fide domicile is genuine."
Mere residence within the state of the forum is not enough to confer
jurisdiction upon the local court.' Nor will the fact that both parties
have appeared in the divorce action entitle the decree to extraterritorial
recognition if there was no domiciliary jurisdiction."0 But this situation
must be distinguished from that where one party has established a domi-
cile and there is a cross-bill by defendant, who has no domicile within
the jurisdiction. Such decrees in favor of cross-petitioner are usually
recognized. 2
In so far as divorces obtained in the United States are concerned, it
may be concluded that there are two necessary requirements in estab-
lishing a bona fide domicile: (I) intent to establish a domicile, which
may be shown by the motive of the petitioner; (2) physical presence
within the jurisdiction where the domicile is being established.
To obtain a valid divorce in a foreign country, that court must also
have jurisdiction of the cause before the rule of "comity" will be exer-
cised. There must be physical presence of the plaintiff to entitle the
decree to recognition in this country on the basis of comity. The intent
to establish a bona fide domicile is also necessary to give the court of a
foreign country jurisdiction before the courts of the several states will
recognize the decree. Because of the lack of the above requisites, Mex-
" Gildersleeve v..Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 689, 9z At. 684 (1914)i Cochran v.
Cochran, supra; Broder v. Broder, 522 Cal. App. 296, 5o Pac. (2d) 5932.
"nState v. Cooke, xio Conn. 348, 148 At!. 385 (1930)i Jones v. Jones, 17 Ohio
N.P. (N.S.) 456, z8 Ohio D. N.P. 644. (i91S); Lister v. Lister, 86 N.J. Eq. 30, 97 At!.
170 (i9xS)5 Reik v. Reik, 1o9 N.J. Eq. 61S, x58 Atl. Si9 (1932).
" Morris v. Gilmer, 529 U.S. 315, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289 (x889); Plant v. Harrison,
36 Mis. Rep. 649, 74 N.Y.S. 411 (1902).
5
"Bragiere v. Brugiere, 172 Cal. 599, iss Pac. 988 (ig6); Di Brigide v. Di
Brigide, supra, note 8; Jones v. Jones, supra, note 16; Snyder v. Buckeye State Bldg. and
Loan Co., 26 Ohio App. 166, 16o N.E. 37 (1927)i Morey v. Morey, 27 Minn. 26£, 6
N.W. 783 (188o)5 Williams v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 442 (913);
Morris v. Gilmer. supra, note 17.
"9 Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, supra, note i55 Larrick v. Walters, 39 Ohio App.
363, 177 N.E. 642 (1930); Brugiere v. Brugiere, supra, note i8 Cochran v. Cochran,
supra , note 8.
0Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237 (190Z); Lister v. Lister,
supra, note 16i see 25 Minn. L.R. 599 for discussion of Estoppel to Attack Void Divorce,
for Lack of Juridiction-Appearance.
'-Jcnness v. Jenness, 24 Ind. 355, 87 Am. Dec. 23£ (1865); Clutton v. Clutton,
ioS Mich. 267, 66 N.W. £z (1896); Contra, Valk v. Valk, i8 R.I. 639, 29 Atl. 499
(1894).
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ican divorces are seldom recognized in the United States. 2 But if the
petitioner should establish a bona fide domicile in Mexico these decrees
would probably be recognized by our state courts. Nor can the parties,
by consent, confer jurisdiction upon the Mexican court if neither is dom-
iciled there.23 But the New York court has held that,24 when the wife,
domiciled in New York, had applied through her counsel for a divorce
in Mexico and the husband, also domiciled in New York, had employed
counsel to contest the Mexican proceedings and a divorce was granted,
the husband was estopped from attacking the decree. This case has
probably been overruled.2 5  In the Alzmann v. Moher" ' case it was
held that although the husband, who was domiciled in New York, had
defended by means of counsel a divorce action being brought in Mexico
by his wife who was domiciled in New York, he could not later obtain
a nr rriage license in New York because the Mexican decree was invalid.
Under the laws of divorce in France, it is necessary that the plaintiff
be a resident there and the defendant must either be aresident at the
time of the granting of the divorce or employ counsel before leaving the
country, so that there may be counsel to defend the case. There is only
one reported case in which a French divorce has been attacked in the
United States. 6 In this case the parties had their matrimonial domicile
in New York, but had lived in France for some time. The husband
was granted a divorce in France and then the wife returned to New
York to seek a divorce. It was denied because the wife had submitted
to the jurisdiction of the French court, and was estopped from attacking
the decree.
One may conclude from the foregoing discussion that in order to
have a divorce decree of a foreign state or country recognized in the
forum of the matrimonial domicile, that court must have obtained juris-
diction of the cause. Jurisdiction, in turn, depends upon the establish-
22 Bergeron v. Bergeron, 287 Mass. 524, 192 N.E. 86 (1934); Greenburg v. Green-
Zurg, z8 App. Div. 104, z8 N.Y.S. 87 (1926); Bauman v. Bauman, 250 N.Y. 382,
xo5 N.E. 81g (z929); Alzmann v. Moher, 231 App. Div. 139, z46 N.Y.S. 6o (193o);
Commonwealth v. Monzi, izo Pa. Super. 360, 82 At. 795 "(1935)5 Ryder v. Ryder, z
Cal. App. (7d) 426, 37 Pac. (2d) io69 (1934)-
Ia Bonner v. Reondrew, 203 Iowa 1355, 214 N.W. 536 (s927)-
24 Webberv. WeAber, 135 Mis. Rep. 717, 238 N.Y.S. 333 (1929).
" .dlzmann v. Moher, supra, note 22; Kegley v. Kegley, x6 Cal. App. (2d) 383,
6o Pac. (2d) 48z (1936). The California court held that the divorce obtained in Mexico
was invalid although the defendant in that action had filed a confession of judgment.
The defendant in the Mexican divorce was not estopped later from seeking a divorce in
California.
: Sfupra, note 22.
a Gould v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490 (1923); Schneider v. Schneider, 232
App. Div. 71, 249 N.Y.S. 131 (1931). Husband who was resident of France obtained a
divorce there and the wife appeared and submitted to jurisdiction. New York court refused
to grant a declaratory judgment that she was the lawful wife of defendant who had
remarried in United States.
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ment by the petitioner of a bona fide domicile. A bona fide domicile is
composed of two requisites: (I) intent, and (2) physical presence.
Apart from special requirements such as exist in New York and a few
other states, the majority of the courts would recognize a foreign decree
if the above requirements are established. The states requiring such
requisites have accomplished the purpose of protecting" the marital status
of their citizens. This seems to be a desirable limitation on the recogni-
tion of foreign divorce decrees. R. W. VANDEMARK
EQUITY
JURISDICTION OF EQUITY TO ENJOIN CITIZENS SUING IN A
FOREIGN COUNTRY
Labak and Grazner were residents of Canton, Ohio. On January
19, 1935, Labak instituted a suit in Czechoslovakia upon a grocery
account alleged due from Grazner and three others. Joseph Grazner
had been discharged in bankruptcy and the account had been listed as a
claim against his estate. This was admitted by demurrer as was the
fact that the other plaintiffs named in the Labak suit had never con-
tracted for the debt upon which they were being sued. The plaintiff
sought to enjoin further proceedings by the defendant in Czechoslo-
vakia. The demurrer by the defendant was overruled. The trial court
issued an injunction, which decree was affirmed by the court of appeals.
Labak v. Grazner, et al., 23 Ohio Abs. 57, 6 N.E. (2nd) 790 (1937).
In transitory actions, the law gives a party the right to bring the
action in any court that acquires jurisdiction; and based on the assump-
tion that the foreign court can do full and complete justice, it is not
inequitable for one to choose to litigate his claim in a forum that will be
more favorable to him. Royal League v. Kavanaugh, 233 Il1. 175, 134
Ill. App. 75, 84 N.E. 178 (1908); Carson v. Dunham, 149 Mass. 52,
14 Am. St. Rep. 397, 20 N.E. 312 (1889); Thorndike v. Thorn-
dike, 142 Ill. 450, 32 N.E. 510, 21 L.R.A. 71 (1892); Edgell v.
Clark, 45 N.Y. Supp. 979 (897); Delaware R. & W. R. Co. v.
.lshelman, 300 Pa. 291, 15o Ad. 475, 69 L.R.A. 588 (930); Fed.
Trust Co. v. Conklin, 87 N.J. Eq. 185, 99 Ad. 1o9 (1916). Where-
ever the parties are residents, however, the court, having authority to
issue its decree in personam, may, in a proper case, enjoin those within
its jurisdiction from prosecuting a suit in another state; and such decree
is not an interference with the proceedings of a foreign court. Chaffee
and Simpson, Cases on Equity, 1934, vol. I, p. 164; Gordon v. Munn,
